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Foreign Direct Investment, Child Labour and Unemployment of 
Unskilled Labour in a Dual Economy  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Poverty has been attributed as the single largest factor behind the incidence of child labour in a 
developing economy. It compels people to have large families and children to go out in the job 
market and earn their own means of livelihood. However, empirical evidences that incomes of the 
poorer section of the population have not changed significantly in absolute terms1 and that the 
incidence of child labour has decreased satisfactorily in most of the developing economies2 
suggest that that there are factors other than poverty that have contributed to the decline of the 
child labour problem in the liberalized era.  
 
Empirical studies e.g. Cigno et al. (2002) and Neumayer and Soysa (2005) have reported that 
trade and investment reforms have produced a favorable impact on child labour. However, 
whatever little impact the liberalized policies have so far made on child labour must have come 
through channels other than the income effect. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature on how 
economic reforms can impinge on the incidence of child labour is yet to evolve3. The emergence 
of this literature is urgently needed that should identify the different channels through which 
                                                 
1 See Wade and Wolf (2002), Khan (1998) and Tendulkar et al. (1996) in this context.  
 
2 ILO (2006) has reported that the number of economically active children in the 5-14 age group 
declined by 11 per cent in 2004 from the 2000 figure. The decline is the sharpest for Latin 
America and Caribbean, whereas Asia and Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa registered small 
decline in activity rates. For Asia and Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa, child labour participation 
rate (5-14 age group) declined from 19.4 and 28.8 to 18.8 and 26.4, respectively (during 2000 to 
2004). For Latin America and Caribbean, activity rate declined from 16.1 % in 2000 to 5.1 % in 
2004. 
 
3 Theoretical papers on child labour like Basu and Van (1998), Basu (1999), Ranjan (1999, 
2001), Baland and Robinson (2000) and Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) have not discussed the 
relationship between economic reforms and the child labour incidence. Dwibedi and Chaudhuri 
(2010) is, however, a notable exception. But, they have considered a full-employment general 
equilibrium structure that does not take into consideration some of the essential features of a 
developing economy like imperfections and persistence of unemployment in the market for 
unskilled labour. Furthermore, Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) paper does not examine the 
consequences of economic reforms on the welfare of the child labour supplying families.  
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economic reforms like an inflow of foreign capital can affect the child labour problem in a 
developing economy. The need for identifying the diverse routes has also been recognized by 
Neumayer and Soysa (2005).  
 
In the circumstances, the present paper is designed to ascertain the different ways through which 
economic reforms can have a bearing on the incidence of child labour in a developing economy 
using a three-sector specific-factor Harris-Todaro type general equilibrium model. Although the 
model only analyzes the consequence of liberalized investment policies, it may be useful in 
studying the effects of trade reforms as well. The workers are not the owners of capital and the 
capitalist class does not supply child labour. The supply function of child labour of each working 
family is derived from its intertemporal utility-maximizing behaviour. Sector 1 in the general 
equilibrium model is the rural sector where child labour is used along with adult unskilled labour 
and capital to produce an agricultural commodity. Sector 2 is an urban sector where a low-skill 
manufacturing good is produced by means of adult unskilled labour and capital. Finally, sector 3, 
another urban sector, employs skilled labour and capital to produce a high-skill commodity. 
There are imperfections in the market for unskilled labour in sector 2 where the unskilled workers 
receive a high unionized wage while their counterparts in the rural sector earn a competitive 
wage. There is unemployment of unskilled labour in the urban sector. Using this setup it is found 
that inflows of foreign capital can indeed lower the problem of child labour by raising the return 
to education and the non-child income of the working households and by lowering the earning 
opportunities of children. Besides the paper shows that inflows of foreign capital are likely to 
improve the welfare of the child labour supplying families although the urban unemployment 
problem of the unskilled labour may not improve. The paper, thus, demonstrates that reduction in 
poverty is not a necessary condition for the problem of child labour to improve. There are factors 
other than reduction of poverty that not only mitigate the child labour problem but also improve 
the welfare of the families that supply child labour. 
 
 
2. Derivation of family supply function of child labour 
 
The supply function of child labour by each working family is determined from its intertemporal 
utility maximizing behaviour. Let us consider a two period optimizing problem of the 
representative working family consisting of one adult member (the guardian) and n number of 
children with 1n  . Staying in line with the traditional model of the household (Becker 1964), 
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we consider each household as a single decision making unit. On behalf of the family the 
guardian unilaterally takes decision regarding allocation of consumption in the two periods and 
the labour supply of his children. The guardian in the first period works in the adult labour market 
and earns a wage 0W .
4 In this period, he takes decision about his children’s work effort and 
schooling. Cl number of children are sent out to work at the wage rate CW . The non-existence of a 
market for loans against future earnings compels the parent to use income from child work to 
smooth out the family consumption5. The remaining children who are not sent out to work are 
sent to school.6 Hence ( )Cn l numbers of children are sent to school.  So, Cl number of child 
workers earns the child wage ( )CW in the first period and the unskilled adult wage ( )W in the 
second period while the remaining ( )Cn l children earn nothing in the first period and the skilled 
wage ( )SW in the second period.
7 In the presence of positive return on education, SW is greater 
than W . In the second period, the guardian earns nothing and lives on the income he receives 
from his children who have become adult workers by this time.  
 
We assume that parent cares only about the lifetime family consumption and does not attach any 
value to the child’s leisure.8 The utility is therefore a function of consumption levels in the two 
periods (1and 2 ). For algebraic simplicity we assume a logarithmic utility function with unitary 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  
                                                 
4 0W can take two values, W (unskilled wage) and SW (skilled wage), depending on the type of the 
representative working household.  
 
5 There are informal credit markets in developing countries as a substitute to missing formal 
credit market, but they mainly deal with short-term loans. Poor households need long-term credit 
to be able to substitute for the foregone earnings of their children, which is missing in the 
developing countries. See for example, Baland and Robinson (2000), Jafery and Lahiri (2002), 
Ranjan (1999, 2001) in this context.  
 
6 This is a simplifying assumption that ignores the existence of non-labour non-school goers. 
 
7 Introduction of uncertainty in securing a skilled job in the second period would be an interesting 
theoretical exercise. However, the major findings of the model remain unaffected if the 
probability in finding a high-skill job is given exogenously.  
 
8 This is a marked departure from the Basu and Van (1998) paper that considers an altruistic 
parent who cares about the well-being of his children and derives disutility from the labour 
supplied by his offspring.  
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1 2log logV C C                                                       (1)  
 where  is the time discount factor. 
 
The first period’s consumption ( 1C ) consists of wage income of the guardian and child wage 
income from the working children. So we have 
1 0( )C CC W l W                 (2)                                               
The second period’s consumption ( 2C ) can be thought of as the sum of skilled wage income of 
educated adult (schooled in the first period) workers and unskilled wage income of uneducated 
adult labourers (worked in the first period). Therefore, 2C is given as follows:  
2 ( ( ) )C C SC l W n l W                                                                (3)  
We assume that the only cost of education is the opportunity cost in terms of forgone earnings of 
children.9 
 
The guardian maximizes the lifetime utility (Equation (1)) with respect to Cl and subject to (2) 
and (3). Maximization gives the following first-order condition. 
0
( ( ) ) ( )
( )
C C S S
C C C
l W n l W W W
W l W W
                                                                                    (4)
 
 
Solving equation (4) the following child labour function by each working family is obt ained.  
0
(1 )( ) (1 )
S
C
S C
nW Wl
W W W

 
 
  
                        (5) 
 
The properties of the child labour supply function, given by (5), are as follows. An increase in 
current income 0, ,W (income from non-child source) raises both 1C and 2C and hence lowers 
Cl through a positive income effect. An increase in the child wage rate implies an increase in the 
opportunity cost of education and hence leads to more child labour supply (i .e. less schooling). 
Any changes in skilled and/or unskilled wage affect the return to education and therefore 
influence the guardian’s decision regarding allocation of his children between education and 
                                                 
9 One can, of course, incorporate direct schooling cost without affecting the qualitative results of 
the model. 
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work. For example, an increase in skilled wage ( )SW  or a decrease in unskilled wage ( )W will 
make education more attractive and raises the number of school-going children from each family 
thereby lowering the supply of child labour by the household.  
 
 
3. The General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
We consider a small open dual economy with two broad sectors: rural and urban. The urban 
sector is further subdivided into two subsectors so that in all we have three sectors. Sector 1 
produces an agricultural commodity, 1X , using adult unskilled labour ( )L , child labour ( )CL and 
capital ( )K . The capital-output ratio in sector 1, 1,Ka  is assumed to be technologically given.
10 
Sector 2 is an urban sector that produces a low-skill manufacturing good, 2X , by means of capital 
and unskilled labour11. The presupposition that child labour is used only in the agricultural sector 
is simplifying. However, it is partly justified on the ground that more than 70 per cent of 
economically active children in the developing countries are engaged in agriculture and allied 
sectors and less than 9 per cent are involved in manufacturing (ILO (2002) report). Finally, sector 
3, another urban sector, uses capital and skilled labour ( S ) to produce a high-skill 
commodity, 3X . Skilled labour is a specific input in sector 3 while child labour is specific to 
sector 1. Unskilled labour is imperfectly mobile between sectors 1 and 2 while capital is 
completely mobile among all the three sectors of the economy.  
 
Sector 2 faces a unionized labour market where unskilled workers receive a contractual 
wage, *W , while the unskilled wage rate in the rural sector, ,W is market determined 
with .* WW  The two wage rates are related by the Harris-Todaro (1970) condition of migration 
                                                 
10 Although this is a simplifying assumption it is not completely without any basis. Agriculture 
requires inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides etc. which are to be used in recommended 
doses. Now if capital is used to purchase those inputs, the capital-output ratio becomes constant 
technologically. However, even if the capital-output ratio is not given technologically the results 
of the paper still hold under an additional sufficient condition relating to partial elasticities of 
substitution between capital and other inputs in sector 1.  
 
11 Even if sector 2 is allowed to use child labour the results of model hold under different 
sufficient conditions containing terms of relative intensities in which child labour and other two 
inputs are used in the first two sectors.  
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equilibrium where the expected urban wage equals the rural wage rate. Hence, there is urban 
unemployment of unskilled labour. The capital endowment of the economy includes both 
domestic capital, DK , and foreign capital, FK . Incomes from foreign capital are completely 
repatriated. Sector 2 uses capital more intensively with respect to unskilled labour vis -à-vis sector 
1. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale12 with positive and diminishing marginal 
productivity to each factor. Markets, except the urban unskilled labour market, are perfectly 
competitive. All the three commodities are traded internationally. Hence their prices are given 
internationally. Finally, commodity 3 is chosen as the numeraire.  
 
A general equilibrium of the system is represented by the fo llowing set of equations: 
 
1 1 1 1L C C KWa W a Ra P              (6)                                                                     
2 2 2* L KW a Ra P               (7)  
3 3 1S S KW a Ra                                                                                                                       (8) 
where sjia are input-output ratios; and, R is the return to capital. 
1 1C Ca X L                                                                                                                  (9) 
1 1 2 2 3 3K K K D Fa X a X a X K K K                                                                                    (10)    
SXaS 33                                                                                                                                (11) 
LLXaXa ULL  3311            (12) 
 
Equations (6) – (8) are the three competitive industry equilibrium conditions in the three sectors. 
On the other hand, equations (9) − (11) are the full-employment conditions for child labour, 
capital13 and skilled labour, respectively. The unskilled labour endowment is given by (12).  
 
                                                 
12 Even though the capital-output ratio in sector 1 is technologically given, adult labour and child 
labour are substitutes and the production function displays the constant returns to scale property 
in these two inputs.  
 
13 It is assumed that the capital stock of the economy consists of both domestic capital and 
foreign capital which are perfect substitutes. It may be mentioned that this assumption has been 
widely used in the theoretical literature on trade and development.  
 
 8 
Since the probability of finding a job in the low-skill urban manufacturing sector 
is 2 2 2 2/ ( )L L Ua X a X L , the expected unskilled wage in the urban area is 
2 2 2 2( * ) / ( )L L UW a X a X L . Therefore, the allocation mechanism of adult unskilled labour 
between rural and urban areas is expressed as 
2 2 2 2( * ) / ( )L L UW a X a X L W  , 
or equivalently, 
2 2 1 1( * / ) L LW W a X a X L                                                                               ( 13) 
 
The firms in the low-skill urban sector have well-organized trade unions. One of the most 
important roles of the labour unions is to bargain with their respective employers in respect of the 
betterment of the working conditions.  Through offer of negotiation, threat of strike, actual strike 
etc. the trade unions exert pressure on the employers (firms) in order to secure higher wages, 
reduced hours of work, share in profits and other benefits. Organized workers in large firms leave 
no stones unturned so as to reap wages higher than their reservation wage i.e. the rural sector 
unskilled wage14. The relationship for the unionized wage rate is specified as15: 
* *( , )W W W U                                                                                     (14) 
This function satisfies the following properties.  
*W W for 0; *U W W  for 0;U  and, ( * / ), ( * / ) 0W W W U     . 
 
Equation (14) states that in the absence of any bargaining power of the trade unions i.e. when 
0U  , the rural and the urban unskilled wage rates are equal. However, the urban sector wage 
rate, *W , exceeds the competitive rural sector wage rate, W , when there is at least some power 
to the trade unions. The unionized wage is scaled upward as the rural sector wage rate rises. Also 
with an increase in the bargaining power, the unions bargain for a higher wage.  
 
Using (14) equation (7) can be rewritten as  
                                                 
14 See Bhalotra (2002) in this context.  
 
15 Assuming that each formal sector firm has a separate trade union, the unionized wage function 
may be derived as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the representative firm and the 
representative union in the low-skill manufacturing sector. For detailed derivation see Chaudhuri 
and Mukhopadhyay (2009).  
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2 2*( , ) 1L KW W U a Ra                                                                                                       (7.1) 
 
Both unskilled and skilled working families are potential suppliers of child labour and their 
current wage incomes 0( )W are  and ,SW W respectively. Besides, there are L and S numbers of 
unskilled and skilled working families in the economy, respectively. Using equation (5) the 
aggregate child labour supply in the economy is obtained as follows.  
1( )[ ]
1 ( ) ( )
S S S
C
S C S C
nW nW WWL L S
W W W W W W


   
           
        (15) 
 
Using (15) equation (9) can be rewritten as follows.  
1 1
1( )[ ]
1 ( ) ( )
S S S
C
S C S C
nW nW WWa X L S
W W W W W W


   
                (9.1)
 
 
4. Comparative Statics 
 
The general equilibrium structure consists of nine equations, ((6), (7.1), (8), (9.1), (10)  – (13)) 
and (15), and the same number of variables namely; 1 2 3, , , , , , ,C S CW W W R X X X L and UL . This is 
an indecomposable system. The factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor 
endowments. Given the child wage rate, sectors 1 and 2 together effectively form a miniature 
Heckscher-Ohlin system as they use both adult unskilled labour and capital. It is sensible to 
assume that sector 1 is more adult labour-intensive than sector 2 with respect to capital. Totally 
differentiating equations (6), (7.1), (8), (9.1), (10) – (11) and (13) and solving by Cramer’s rule 
the following proposition can be established16.  
Proposition 1: An inflow of foreign capital leads to (i) increases in both adult unskilled wage and 
skilled wage; (ii) a decrease in child wage rate; and, (iii) an expansion of the low-skill urban 
manufacturing sector. The skilled-unskilled wage inequality17 worsens if the high-skill sector is 
capital-intensive (in a special sense) relative to the low-skill sector.  
                                                 
16 These results have been derived in appendix I. 
 
17 There are three groups of unskilled workers in this system earning different wages. Unskilled 
workers employed in the rural and the low-skill urban sectors receive a competitive wage, ,W  
and the unionized wage, *W , respectively while the unemployed urban workers earn nothing.  
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Proposition 1 can be intuitively explained in the following fashion. An inflow of foreign capital 
lowers the return on capital , ,R as the supply rises given the demand. A Rybczynski effect takes 
place in the miniature HOS system comprising of sectors 1 and 2 leading to a contraction of 
sector 1 and an expansion of sector 2 as the latter is more capital-intensive relative to the former 
sector with respect to adult unskilled labour. Sector 3 also expands as it uses capital but a 
different type of labour (skilled labour). The demand for child labour falls in sector 1 while that 
of skilled labour rises in sector 3 as these are the two sector-specific inputs. Consequently, the 
child wage falls while the skilled wage rises. Owing to reduction in capital cost, the unionized 
unskilled wage, *W , has to rise so as to satisfy the zero profit condition in sector 2 (see equation 
(7.1)). But, *W can increase only if the competitive unskilled wage,W , rises. 
WhyW and *W increase is easily understandable. Sector 2 expands both in terms of output and 
employment following an inflow of foreign capital. The expected urban wage for a prospective 
rural unskilled migrant rises unambiguously that paves the way for a fresh migration into the 
urban sector. The availability of unskilled labour in the rural sector falls, which in turn causes the 
rural unskilled wage,W , to rise. *W also rises asW rises. What happens to the skilled-unskilled 
wage inequality depends on the rates of increase in SW andW . If 2 2 3 3( / ) ( / )K L K S    the 
saving on capital cost in the low-skill manufacturing sector (sector 2) is less  than that in the high-
skill sector, which in turn, implies that the rate of increase of the unionized unskilled wage, *W  
(and hence that of W as 01  WE ), is smaller than that of the skilled wage, SW . Thus, the 
wage inequality worsens if the low-skill manufacturing sector is less capital-intensive vis-à-vis 
the high-skill sector in a special sense.18  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
The average wage for unskilled labour is given by 1 2( * )A L LW W W   where 1L  and 
2L denote the proportion of unskilled labour employed in sectors 1 and 2, respectively. Using 
(13), we can write WWA  . It may be mentioned that the average wage of the workers 
(unskilled workers in this case) in a Harris-Todaro economy is equal to the rural sector wage. 
This is known as the ‘envelope property’. 
                                           
18 Here sectors 2 and 3 use two different types of labour. However, there is one intersectorally 
mobile input which is capital. So, these two sectors cannot be classified in terms of factor 
intensities which is usually done in the Hechscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Despite this, a special 
type of factor intensity classification in terms of the relative distributive shares of the mobile 
factor i.e. capital can be made for analytical purposes. The sector in which this share is higher 
relative to the other may be considered as capital-intensive in a special sense. See Jones and 
Neary (1984) for details. 
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To analyze the outcome of foreign capital inflows on the supply of child labour in the economy 
after totally differentiating equation (15) the following proposition can be proved19. 
Proposition 2: An inflow of foreign capital lowers the incidence of child labour in the economy 
if the high-skill sector is capital-intensive relative to the low-skill sector. 
 
We intuitively explain proposition 2 as follows. In proposition 1 we have stated how different 
factor prices and the relative wage inequality respond to inflows of foreign capital. A fall in the 
child wage rate, CW , means a decrease in the opportunity cost of education. On the other hand,  the 
return to education rises as the wage inequality rises. Finally, the initial incomes from non-child 
source of both the unskilled and skilled working families have increased which lower the supply 
of child labour by each family via the positive income effect. Hence, under the sufficient 
condition that the high-skill sector is capital-intensive all these three effects work in the same 
direction and lower the problem of child labour in the society. 
 
Let us now turn to analyze the outcome of an inflow of foreign capital on the unemployment of 
unskilled labour in the urban sector. Subtraction of (12) from (13) yields 
2 2
*( 1)U L
WL a X
W
           (16) 
Differentiating (16) the following proposition can be established.20 
Proposition 3: An inflow of foreign capital produces an ambiguous effect on the unemployment 
of unskilled labour in the urban sector. 
 
We explain proposition 3 in the following manner. In the migration equilibrium the expected 
urban wage for a prospective unskilled rural migrant equals the actual unskilled rural wage. An 
inflow of foreign capital affects the migration equilibrium in two ways. First, the low-skill urban 
manufacturing sector expands following a Rybczynski effect. This leads to an increase in the 
number of jobs available in this sector. The expected urban wage for a prospective rural 
migrant, 2 2[ * /{1 ( / )}],U LW L a X increases as the probability of getting a job in this sector rises 
for every unskilled worker. This is the centrifugal force which paves the way for fresh migration 
                                                 
19  The proof is available in appendix II. 
 
20 See appendix III for detailed derivations.  
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from the rural to the urban sector. Second, an inflow of foreign capital raises the rural unskilled 
wage (see proposition 1). This is the centripetal force that prevents rural workers from migrating 
into the urban sector. Thus, there are clearly two opposite effects working on determination of the 
size of the unemployed urban unskilled workforce. The net effect on unemployment is, therefore, 
ambiguous.  
 
Finally, we would like to examine the consequence of foreign capital inflows on the welfare of 
the child labour supplying families. Differentiating equations (1) – (3) and using (5) the final 
proposition of the model can be established as follows.21 
Proposition 4: An inflow of foreign capital improves the welfare of the child labour supplying 
families if ( )S SnW W W   .  
 
As the two wage rates and the relative wage inequality increase and the incidence of child labour 
declines the consumption of the household in period 2, 2C , rises unequivocally owing to inflows 
of foreign capital. However, the effect on the consumption level in period 1, 1C , is not so obvious. 
This is because 1C rises as 0W rises while it falls as the income from child labour, C CW l , declines. 
However, the expansionary effects on 2C outweigh the negative effects on 1C under the sufficient 
condition as stated in the proposition. Consequently, the welfare of the working families 
improves. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
The paper has identified the different channels through which liberalized economic policies can 
influence the incidence of child labour in a developing economy in terms of a three-sector 
specific-factor Harris-Todaro type general equilibrium model. The existence of imperfections in 
the market for unskilled labour and the persistence of unemployment in the urban sector have 
been taken into consideration. The interesting result is that inflows of foreign capital might exert 
a downward pressure on the child labour incidence by raising the return to education (premium 
on skill) and the initial non-child incomes of the working families and by lowering the child wage 
i.e. the opportunity cost of schooling. Hence the child labour incidence may improve even if non-
child incomes of the families do not increase. There are enough other forces brought about by 
                                                 
21 This result has been proved in appendix IV. 
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economic reforms that can overcompensate for decreased parental incomes. Hence, reduction of 
poverty is not a necessary condition for the problem of child labour to improve in the developing 
economies following economic reforms. These results are consistent with empirical findings that 
the incidence of child labour has decreased at least in relative terms although the problem of 
poverty has increased in many developing countries following economic reforms. Besides, the 
analysis shows that inflows of foreign capital are likely to improve the welfare of the families that 
supply child labour although the urban unemployment problem of unskilled labour may not 
improve.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I: 
 
Totally differentiating equations (6), (7.1) and (8) and using envelope conditions the following 
expressions are obtained. 
0ˆˆˆ 111  RWW KCCL                                                                          (A.1)  
2 2
ˆ ˆ 0L W KE W R                                                                                     (A.2)  
0ˆˆ 33  RW KSS                                                                            (A.3) 
where: ji distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector; and, '' proportional change. 
 
Totally differentiating equations (9.1), (10), (11) and (13)), collecting terms and simplifying we 
get the following expressions. 
 0ˆˆˆˆˆ 2211
1
1  XXRSWSWS LLLKCLCLLL                                                               (A.4)  
2 1 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
KL S K KS W A R AW X X K                                                                                (A.5)  
1 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0CL CC C SS E W S F W GW X                                                                          (A.6)  
[Note that we have used RSWSX SRSSS ˆˆˆ
33
3   from (11)] 
where:  
* 2 1
2 1[ {( 1) } )] 0;LL L W LL L LLS E S S      * 22 0;LK L LKS S   
2 3
2 3( ) 0;KK K KK K KKS S S   
2
2 0;KL K KLS S  3 31 3 ( ) 0;K SK KSA S S  
3
2 3( ) 0;KK K SKA S S  
*
2 2
* 0;L L
W
W
                                                                       (A.7)      
2
. 0;
(1 ) ( )
S
C S
W WA
L W W
 
 
0.
(1 ) C C
B
L W


 

                               
( ( ) );E nA L S BLW    ( ) 0;SF B LW SW   [ ( ) ] 0;SG nA L S BSW          
k
jiS  the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector, , , , ,Cj i L S L K ; and, 
k = 1,2,3. 0kjiS for ij  ; and, ;0
k
jjS and, ji proportion of the j th input employed in 
the i th sector. 
 
Arranging (A.1) – (A.6) in the matrix notation we get the following.  
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1 1 1
2 2
3 3
1 *
1 1 2
2 1 1 2
1 1
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0
0
( ) ( ) 0 1 0
L C K
L W K
K S
LL L LC LK L L
KL K K
CL CC
E
S S S
S A A
S E S F G
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    



















2
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
X
X
W
R
W
W
S
C
=




















0
ˆ
0
0
0
0
K
                        (A.8)  
 
Solving (A.8) by Cramer’s Rule the following expressions are obtained.  
*
3 1 2 2ˆ ˆ( )S C K LW K    

                                                                                                        (A.9)  
*
3 2ˆ ˆ( )S LCW K
  


                                                                                                           (A.10) 
*
3 1 2 2ˆ ˆ( )S C W L LER K   

                                                                                                      (A.11)  
*
3 1 2 2ˆ ˆ( )K C W L LS
EW K    

                                                                                                 (A.12)   
*
1 2 2 3 3 2( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )C L L W K S KS
EW W K       

                                                                    (A.13)     
1 1
2 3 1 2 1 3 1 3
ˆˆ ( )[ { ( )} ( )S L LC CC L C W K L S LK
KX S S F E G S            

 
                                                                        11 2 3 1{ ( )}]C K S LL L CLS S E         (A.14) 
where, 
* *
3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2{ } ( )K C W L S L S C L W LK K LE BSW A E S A                 
                             1 13 2 1{( ) }S CC K L LCS F S            
                             1 *3 1 2 2 2{( ) ( )}S C K CL K LL L KLS BLW S S          
                                                                          1 2 3( ) ( )C K KnA L S                            (A.15)                         
*
1 2 1 2( ) 0L K K LLK       ; and, 
1 2 1 2( ) 0L K K W LLK E                                                                                                   (A.16)  
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(Note that , 0   as sector 2 is more capital-intensive than sector 1 with respect to adult 
unskilled labour). 
 
Using (A.7) and (A.16) from (A.15) it follows that  
0  if 3 2 2 3K W L K SE    .                                                                                                (A.17) 
However, 3 2 2 3K W L K SE    is only a sufficient condition for  to be negative. 
  
Using (A.7), (A.15) and (A.16) from (A.9) – (A.14) we can obtain the following results.  
(i) 0ˆ W when 0ˆ K ;  
(ii) 0ˆ CW when 0ˆ K ;  
(iii) 0ˆ R  when 0ˆ K ;  
(iv) 0ˆ SW  when 0ˆ K ;                                                                                            (A.18) 
 (v) 0)ˆˆ( WWS  when 0ˆ K iff 3 2 2 3K W L K SE    ; 
(vi) 2ˆ 0X   when 0ˆ K .  
 
 
Appendix II: 
 
We use equation (15) to examine the impact of foreign capital inflows on the incidence of child 
labour in the economy. Totally differentiating equation (1 5) we get 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )( ) ( )C S S S C SL nA L S W W LBWW SBW W BW W S LW                                 (A. 19) 
 
Using (A.9) – (A.13), the expression (A.19) may be rewritten as follows. 
* * *
1 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 2
1ˆ ( )[ ( ) ( )C C L K W L S K S C K L S K C L LL nA L S E LBW SBW                 
 
                                                                             *3 2 ˆ( ) ]S S LB SW LW K                   (A.20) 
 
From (A.20) we find that. 
0ˆ CL  when 0ˆ K if 3 2 3 2K W L S KE    . 
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So, the incidence of child labour decreases following inflows of foreign capital under the 
sufficient condition: 3 2 3 2K W L S KE    .This implies that sector 3 is capital-intensive relative to 
sector 2. However, this result may hold under other sufficient conditions as well.  
 
 
Appendix III: 
 
Differentiating (16) one gets 
2 222
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
( ) ( ) [ ( )(1 )]( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
U L LU
LK W W LK
LU
L X W RS E E S
K K K K
 

         (A.21) 
Using (A.9), (A.11) and (A.14) and simplifying from the above equation we obtain  
1 1 1
3 1 2 1 1
ˆ 1( ) ( )[ { ( ) ( )}ˆ
U
S C K LL L CL L LC CL
L S S S S F
K
         

 
                                                 1 1 3 2 3 2( ) ( )]C L K W L S KnA L S E         
     * 21 2 3 2 3 21 2
2 3
( )[ ( ) { ( )(1 )}]C K S L W K S L LUL L W LK W
K S LU
E SWB WL E S E       
  
    

   (A.22) 
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
UL
K
 if 22 3 21*
2 2 3
[ ( ) { ( )(1 )}]L W K S L LUL W LK W
L K S LU
E SWB WL E S E   
   
                (A.23)  
 
Appendix IV: 
 
Differentiation of equation (1) yields  
1 2
ˆ ˆdV C C           (A.24) 
Substituting the expression for Cl from (5) into (2) and (3) and simplifying one gets 
1
( )[ ]
(1 )( )
S C S
S
W W W nW WC
W W
 
 
; and,       (A.25) 
2
( )[ ]
(1 )
S C S
C
W W W nW WC
W


 

       (A.26) 
 
Differentiating (A.25) and (A.26) we respectively, find 
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2
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )[ ( ) {( ) ( )}]ˆ [
[ ( ) ]
S S C S S C S
S C S
W W W W W W nW W W W W W W WC
W W W nW W
     
 
;and,  (A.27) 
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ){ ( 2 ) ( ) }]
ˆ [
[ ( ) ]
C S S S S S S C
C
S C S
WW nW W W W W W W W W W
WC
W W W nW W
    

 
   (A.28) 
Substitution of the expressions for 1Cˆ and 2Cˆ into (A.24) and simplification produce 
21 ˆ[ ][ ( ) {( ) }
[ ( ) ] S S C SS C S
dV W W W W W W nW W
W W W nW W
    
 
 
                                                       ˆ ˆ( )S SW W W WW   
                         ˆ ˆ( ) { ( ) } { ( )}]S C C S S C S S SW W W nW W W W W nW W W W W W                
or, 2
1( ) [ ][( )( ){( ) }
[ ( ) ] S S C SS C S
dV dWW W W W nW W
dK W W W nW W dK
    
 
 
                              (+)                                        (+)                       (+)  
                                                       {( ) ( )}SdW dWW
dK dK
   
                                                                            (+)  
           ( )( ){ ( ) } ( ){ ( )}]C SS S S C S
C
dW dWWW W nW W W nW W W W
dK W dK
         (A.29)                                                                  
                                (-)                                                       (+)                
  
From (A.29) it follows that  
( ) 0dV
dK
 if ( )C S SW nW W W W          (A.30) 
As 1; ;Sn W W  and, CW W from (A.30) it follows that 
( ) 0dV
dK
 if ( )S SnW W W           (A.31) 
However, from (A.29) it is easily seen that ( )S SnW W W   is only a sufficient condition 
for ( ) 0dV
dK
 . One can find out several other sufficient conditions under which ( ) 0dV
dK
 .   
 
 
 
